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BE WARY OF ADDING YOUR OWN SOUNDTRACK:
LENZ v. UNIVERSAL AND HOW THE FAIR USE POLICY
SHOULD BE APPLIED TO USER GENERATED CONTENT
I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Prevalenceof User Generated Content
The most popular websites on the Internet today are those that contain
user generated content (UGC).' These websites allow users to upload
material that the users create; however, this material may contain
copyrighted works.2 Not only are these websites frequently visited, they
Websites such as YouTube,
are also highly lucrative businesses.3
Facebook, and MySpace have millions of members and are worth hundreds
of millions of dollars.4 According to one report, websites utilizing UGC
earned approximately one billion dollars in advertising revenue in 2007. 5
In fact, UGC is "currently one of the fastest growing forms" of media
found on the Internet. 6 Another survey shows that over half of the Internet
users in the United States view UGC at least once a month.7 Copyright
holders are now concerned that their intellectual property rights are being

1. INTERACTIVE ADVER. BUREAU, USER GENERATED CONTENT, SOCIAL MEDIA,

AND ADVERTISING-AN OVERVIEW 1 (Apr. 2008),
http://www.iab.net/media/file/2008.ugc-platform.pdf [hereinafter IAB I].
2. Note, The Principlesfor User Generated ContentServices: A Middle-GroundApproach
to Cyber-Governance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1398 (2008) [hereinafter Middle-Ground
Approach].
3. IAB I, supra note I (stating that in 2006, sixty-nine million users in the United States
visited UGC websites, and UGC websites generated one billion dollars in advertising revenue in
2007).
4. Knowledge@Wharton, What is YouTube Really Worth?, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/entrepreneurs/2006/10/05/google-yahoo-youtube-ent-fincx kw 1006wharton.html.
5. Paul Verna, User GeneratedContent: Will Web 2.0 Pay Its Way?, EMARKETER (June
2007), availableat
http://www.emarketer.com/Reports/All/Emarketer_2000421 .aspx?src-report-headinfojreports.
6. IAB I, supra note 1.
7. eMarketer, User GeneratedContent,Fad or For Real?, INTERACTIVE ADVER. BUREAU,
May 2008, http://www.iab.net/insights-research-/iab-research/1675/287430.
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8
violated with the increasing popularity of UGC websites.
As a result of these emerging intellectual property issues, lawmakers
should pass new laws, and the judiciary should interpret existing laws to
help those most negatively affected by the increase in UGC. The parties
that would benefit from such intervention include the creators of media
containing potentially infringing UGC, the websites that host UGC, and the
copyright holders who wish to protect their interests.
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) allows a
copyright holder to request by way of a takedown notice that a website
remove material if there is an infringement on its copyright. 9 The main
dispute is whether the copyright holder should have a subjectively or
objectively reasonable basis for filing the takedown notice. This Comment
proposes that clear and objective preconditions should be satisfied before a
copyright holder can properly file a takedown notice. Such preconditions
are consistent with the fair use doctrine of copyright law and will balance
the creativity of UGC creators with the rights of copyright holders.
Part I of this Comment describes the issues users may face when
confronted with allegations that their uploaded content infringes a
copyright and suggests that a set of objective preconditions be satisfied
before a copyright holder can send a takedown notice. Part II provides
background information on laws and key concepts, such as the DMCA and
the fair use doctrine. Part III analyzes the feasibility of applying the fair
use doctrine to UGC. Finally, Part IV describes other frameworks for
reconciling conflicts between UGC and copyright law that will balance the
rights of people who wish to upload UGC with the need for copyright
protection.

B. The Issue
The issue with UGC is that it frequently contains copyrighted
materials.10 Common examples include copyrighted music playing in the
background of a blog or used as a soundtrack in a home video.11 In
situations like these, most UGC creators are unaware that they may be
violating copyright law. 12 Thus, these creators may be surprised that under
8. Middle-Ground Approach, supra,note 2.
9. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
10. Scott Karp, A Lot of User-GeneratedContent Is Really User-AppropriatedContent,
PUBLISHING 2.0, Nov. 18, 2006, http://publishing2.com/2006/11/18/a-lot-of-user-generatedcontent-is-really-user-appropriated-content/.
11. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (order
denying Universal's motion to dismiss).
12. Bloggers' 'Unclear but Concerned' About Legal Liabilities,
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current federal law a mere allegation of copyright infringement is sufficient
for the copyright holder to file a takedown notice with the website or
Internet service provider (ISP). 13 A takedown notice requires the ISP to
remove the allegedly copyrighted content or otherwise make the website
inaccessible.' 4 This may lead to situations where UGC creators find
themselves in a David-versus-Goliath battle against media conglomerates,
which are most often the copyright holders that have the resources to file
such takedown notices.
Stephanie Lenz's recent lawsuit against Universal Music Corp.,
Universal Music Publishing, and Universal Music Publishing Group
(collectively, Universal) illustrates the friction between UGC creators and
copyright holders.1 5 In February 2007, Lenz uploaded to YouTube a home
video of her one-and-a-half-year-old son dancing to music in their kitchen
in order to share the video with her family and friends. 16 The song "Let's
Go Crazy," by the musician Prince, played in the background of the
twenty-nine-second video. 17 In June 2007, Universal, which owns the
copyright to the song, sent a notice to YouTube demanding that the website
remove the video on the theory that it contained material that infringed its
copyright.' 8 YouTube subsequently notified Lenz via email that her video
was removed due to Universal's allegation of copyright infringement.' 9
YouTube also warned Lenz that she may be permanently banned from
YouTube if it found her infringing on copyrights in the future. 20 Later that
month, with legal assistance from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Lenz
sent YouTube a counter-notification claiming that her video constituted fair
use of the copyrighted material. 2'
YouTube re-posted the video
approximately six weeks later.22
Universal relied on the DMCA to issue the takedown notice.2 3 The
http://researchcopyright.blogspot.com/2008/05/bloggers-unclear-but-conerned-about.htm
(May
22, 2008, 11:19 a.m.).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
14. THE FAIR USE NETWORK, 'Take It Down!': A Guide to Assessing & Responding to
DMCA § 512 Takedown Notices, http://fairusenetwork.org/reference/td.php (last visited Feb. 15,
2009).
15. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
16. Id. at 1151-52.
17. Id. at 1152.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.
22. Id. As of December 1, 2008, the video can still be accessed at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N IKfJHFWlhQ.
23. Id.
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DMCA stipulates that a valid takedown notice requires that the copyright
holder have "a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner
complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the
law.",24 Lenz argued that she was authorized to use the song under the fair
use doctrine of copyright law.25 The crux of Lenz's argument was that
copyright holders cannot, in good faith, order materials taken down without
first considering the issue of fair use.26 Universal argued that the DMCA
does not even mention fair use, nor does it require a good faith belief that
the use of the copyrighted material was not fair use.27 Universal argued
that, under the DMCA, it merely had to demonstrate a subjective good faith
belief that Lenz violated copyright law, making it easier for Universal and
other similarly situated copyright holders to issue takedown notices.28
Universal contended that this subjective "good faith" standard in the
DMCA is ideal for two reasons.2 9 First, copyright holders may not be able
to respond quickly to possible copyright infringements if they are required
to consider fair use possibilities before issuing takedown notices. 30 Second,
it is difficult for copyright holders to predict whether a court may rule in its
favor since a determination of fair use is a fact-intensive inquiry. 3' On
April 8, 2008, the court granted Universal's motion to dismiss the
complaint.32 However, the court allowed Lenz to file an amended
complaint on April 18.33 In the most recent development, the court denied
Universal's August 20, 2008 motion to dismiss the amended complaint.34
The court's decision in Lenz v. Universal will set a precedent as to
how courts will resolve copyright infringement cases involving UGC. If
the court agrees with Lenz, copyright holders will have to make an analysis
of fair use before sending a takedown notice. If the court rules in
Universal's favor, users such as Lenz may be subjected to even more
takedown notices alleging infringement.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006).
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154.
Id.
Id.
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v); see also Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1153.
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1153.
Id.
Id. at 1157.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. User GeneratedContent
Unlike professionally produced traditional media, user generated
content (UGC) is produced by individuals with little or no technical
expertise or creative experience.35 Many different types of media that
Internet users see online, such as blogs and social networking pages,
feature or qualify as UGC. 36 Typically, users upload UGC to websites that
host the content. 37 These websites include video-sharing sites such as
YouTube, or social networking sites like Facebook.38 The users who
upload this content do so for the sake of sharing and generally do not have
an expectation to earn any money as a result of their work. 3 9 Other reasons
for uploading UGC include connecting with peers, achieving recognition
The Organization for
for creativity, or, Simply, self-expression. n
Economic Co-operation and Development, an international organization of
thirty developed countries with a mandate to promote economic growth and
financial stability, defines UGC as "i) content made publicly available
over the Internet, ii) which reflects a 'certain amount of creative effort',
and iii) which is 'created outside of professional routines and practices."Al
The first characteristic of UGC is that the content must be published
or otherwise made available over the Internet. 42 The content should be
accessible on a public website or to a more restricted audience on a social
networking site.4 3 This definition excludes email or other forms of instant
messaging.4 4 The second characteristic is that the content must be the
product of some creative effort.45 The creative effort can include anything

35. lAB I, supra note 1. Of course, this is not to say that professionals cannot create UGC
as a hobby or even in the course of their work. The distinction is that creation of UGC is
typically a lay pursuit that is not exclusively generated by professionals.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. SACHA WUNSH-VINCENT & GRAHAM VICKERY, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND
DEV., PARTICIPATIVE WEB: USER-CREATED CONTENT 8 (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/14/38393115.pdf.

40. Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

WUNSH-VINCENT & VICKERY, supra note 39, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

168

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:163

from personal thoughts posted on a blog to home videos. 46 Finally, UGC
"is generally created outside of professional routines and practices," which
implies that the creators generally are not professionals and do not expect
to make a profit from publishing their content.
The rise in the popularity of UGC and its accompanying legal issues
cannot be ignored. In fact, according to a study commissioned by Nokia, a
world leader in cellular telecommunications, up to twenty-five percent of
the entertainment enjoyed by consumers in the next five years will be
UGC, rather than traditional professionally created media content. 48
B. The DigitalMillennium Copyright Act
Enacted in 1998, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(DMCA) was Congress's effort to balance "the interests of content owners,
on-line and other service providers, and information users in a way that will
foster the continued development of electronic commerce and the growth
of the Internet. 49 Congress designed the DMCA to "enlist the cooperation
of Intemet and other online service providers to combat ongoing copyright
infringement., 50 Consequently, the DMCA provides various remedies for
copyright holders who claim a violation of their rights, such as monetary
and injunctive relief. 51 The copyright holder may seek an order restraining
the service provider from either providing access to the infringing material
or providing access to the user engaged in infringing activity. 52 Courts,
when considering injunctive relief, look at factors, such as the magnitude of
harm the copyright holder is likely to suffer if the material is not removed
and whether an injunction is feasible, effective, and less burdensome than
other available remedies.53
To take advantage of the injunctive protection offered by the DMCA,
the copyright holder must follow the notice and takedown provisions
§ 512(c)(3). 54 First, a party authorized to act on behalf of the copyright
holder must send a written, signed notice of infringement to the service
46. Id.
47. WUNSH-VINCENT & VICKERY, supra note 39, at 4.
48. User-GeneratedContent: The EntertainmentNews of the Future?,GIZMAG, Dec. 4,
2007, http://www.gizmag.com/user-generated-content-entertainment-of-the-future/8449/
(explaining Nokia has over 900 million customers worldwide).
49. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998).
50. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
52. Id. § 512(j)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
53. Id. § 512(j)(2)(A)-(D).
54. Id. § 512(c)(3).
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provider.55 Second, the copyright holder, or its agent, must identify and
locate the content claimed to contain the copyrighted material, thereby
allowing the service provider to remove the offending material.56 Finally,
and most importantly, the DMCA calls for a "statement that the
complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the
manner complained
of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent,
57
or the law.",

To help elicit compliance from online service providers and websites
that host UGC, the DMCA offers a "safe harbor" provision insulating
service providers or hosts from liability associated with copyright
infringement suits. 58 Content hosts must satisfy three requirements to
claim a safe harbor defense under the DMCA. 59 First, the host must not
possess actual knowledge that the material on its network infringes on any
copyrighted material. 60 Therefore, if the host learns of any infringing
material, it must remove the content immediately. 61 "Once the [host] has
actual knowledge of the infringing material, it loses the safe harbor
protections unless it complies with the DMCA. '' 62 Second, the host must
not "receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity., 63 Third, upon receipt of the copyright holder's takedown notice,
the host must remove or disable access to the infringing material. 64 Last,
the host must clearly post its copyright law policy, including the notice and
takedown policies set out in the DMCA.65
Moreover, even though a host is not required to actively patrol its
network for infringing material,66 if a host comes across such content, the
host must remove it immediately.67 Consequently, the host is not liable to
any person for removing or disabling access to alleged infringing content,
nor does it have to notify the user prior to removal of such content. 68 It
must, however, notify the user after removal of the content and advise the
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. § 512(c)(3)(A).
Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (emphasis added).
Id. § 512(c)(1).
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C).
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
See id. § 512(i)(1)(A).
See id. § 512(i)(1)(B)-(2).
See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
Id. § 512(g)(1).
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user of the opportunity to file a counter-notice against the copyright holder
claiming that there is no copyright infringement. 69 Once the user's counternotice is submitted to the host, the host must notify the copyright holder of
the user's objection.70 The copyright holder then has two weeks to file suit
in a federal court, or else the host may repost the material.7v
Unfortunately, the DMCA provides precious few protections for the
user. It is important to note that the DMCA does not require the host to
give notice or warning to the user before removing content.72 The key
provision protecting users is § 512(f), which punishes a copyright holder
who knowingly misrepresents an infringement claim.73 Accordingly, the
DMCA states that "[a]ny person who knowingly materially misrepresents
under this section (1) that material or activity is infringing.., shall be
liable for any damages. 74
In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., the court tested this
misrepresentation provision.7 5 The defendant, Diebold, Inc., manufactured
electronic voting machines that received criticism for their unreliability. 6
Diebold employees exchanged internal emails containing evidence that
noted the problems associated with the machines.77 Though the source was
unclear, eventually the email archive was reproduced on the Internet. 8 The
plaintiffs, represented by a nonprofit legal advocacy group, Online Policy
Group, were college students who posted a hyperlink to the Diebold email
archive in the comments section of an online newspaper article criticizing
the electronic voting machines.7 9 "[I]n an alleged effort to prevent further
public viewing of the email archive" and avoid more public
embarrassment, Diebold sent DMCA takedown notices to entities hosting
the emails. 80 Diebold advised the hosts that "they would be shielded from a
copyright infringement suit ... if they disabled access to or removed the
allegedly infringing material. 81 Essentially, Diebold wished to use the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(2)(A)-(B).
Id. § 512(g)(2)(B).
Id. § 512(g)(2)(C).
Id. § 512(c)(3)(A).
Id. § 512(0.
Id. § 512(0(1).
Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Id. at 1197.
Id.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id. at 1197-98.
Id. at 1198.
Online Policy Group, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.

2009]

ADDING YOUR OWNSOUNDTRACK: LENZ V. UNIVERSAL

171

DMCA to compel the hosts to remove the leaked email archive. 82 The
plaintiffs filed suit and alleged that Diebold knowingly and materially
83
misrepresented its copyright infringement claim.
The Diebold court cited the misrepresentation provision of the
DMCA and stated, "any person who sends a cease and desist letter with
knowledge that claims of infringement are false may be liable for
damages. 8 4 The court first held that publication of the emails was lawful
and not a violation of copyright law because the emails possessed public
interest value. 85 The court noted that Diebold had not identified any
specific commercial purpose effected by the publication of the emails and
that there was no evidence that the publication had any effect on the market
value of those emails 8 6 The court further reasoned that the plaintiffs
neither attempted to sell the emails for profit nor prevented Diebold from
making a profit by revealing the emails.87 Instead, the plaintiffs published
the emails "to support criticism that is in the public interest, not to develop
electronic voting technology." 88
As for the misrepresentation clause of the DMCA,89 the court
concluded that requiring "a party to have an objectively measured
'likelihood of success on the merits' in order to assert claims of copyright
infringement would impermissibly chill the rights of copyright holders." 90
This indicates that the court did not want to make it difficult for copyright
holders to initiate takedown notices nor make it too easy for them to be
liable for misrepresentation. Instead, the court adopted the statutory
language and held that "[a] party is liable if it 'knowingly' and 'materially'
misrepresents that copyright infringement has occurred." 91 It held that
"[n]o reasonable copyright holder could have believed that the [emails]
discussing possible technical problems ... were protected by copyright." 92

82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1202.
85. Id. at 1203 ("The purpose, character, nature of the use, and the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work all indicate that at least part of the email
archive is not protected by copyright law.").
86. Id.
87. Online Policy Group, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203.
88. Id.
89. 17 U.S.C. § 512(0 (2006).
90. Online Policy Group, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.
91. Id. (defining "knowingly" as when a party that actually knew, or should have known if it
acted with reasonable care, that it was making misrepresentations and "material" as the
misrepresentation affected the websites' response to the takedown notice).
92. Id.
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Thus, Diebold was held liable for misrepresenting a copyright infringement
claim for the purposes of suppressing embarrassing emails which were not
protected under copyright law. 93 In support of its holding, the court stated
that Diebold used the DMCA "as a sword to suppress publication of
embarrassing content rather than as a shield to protect its intellectual
property."

94

The Diebold holding provides a deterrent against those who
knowingly misrepresent a copyright infringement claim in hopes of
receiving financial gain or to restrain publication of information. This
portion of the DMCA provides recourse for the creators of UGC by
allowing them to file counterclaims against copyright holders. 95 However,
this provision of the DMCA does not level the playing field for UGC
creators who wish to protect their fair use rights from allegations of
copyright infringement. 96 The Diebold court's reluctance to require
copyright holders to be able to present an objective "likelihood of success"
prior to asserting copyright claims indicates a willingness to insulate
copyright holders97 from liability as long as there is no knowing
misrepresentation.
C. The Fair Use Doctrine
Copyright law is rooted in Article 1, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power ... To
promote the Progress of Science." 98 When the first Copyright Act was
enacted in 1790, Congress believed protecting copyrights was a way of
promoting science and the arts. 99 Congress has since revised copyright law
100
every forty years to keep pace with technological advances.
The judicial doctrine of fair use was applied at common law as a
defense against alleged copyright infringement. 10 1 Congress codified the
fair use defense for the first time in the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "Act"),
noting it was "one of the most important and well-established limitations
on the exclusive right of copyright owners." 10 2 The Act states that the
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1204-05.
Id. at 1205.
17 U.S.C. § 512(0 (2006).
See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976).
Online Policy Group, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.

98. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
99. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976).

100. Id.
101. Id. at 65.
102. Id.
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reproduction of copyrighted works "for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching.., scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright."'10 3 The Supreme Court has consistently held
that fair use is not an infringement of copyright.10 4 The four factors that
courts consider when determining whether fair use applies are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyright
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.' °5
The first factor asks whether the use of the copyrighted material "adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message." 106 This "transformative"
work furthers the goal of copyright law--the promotion of science and the
arts.'0 7 The second factor recognizes that "some works are closer to the
core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence
that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are
copied." 10 8 The third factor asks whether the "quantity and value of the
materials used are reasonable for the purpose of the copying."' 0 9 Finally,
the fourth factor takes into account the extent of market harm caused by the
alleged infringer. 10 This factor further considers the effect of large-scale
copying on the potential market, taking into "account not only.., harm to
the original but also ... harm to the market for derivative works."' '
Courts use this four-factor analysis to determine whether a defendant can
raise fair use as an affirmative defense to allegations of copyright
infringement. 112
However, fair use cannot authorize the use of copyrighted material
because it is only a defense to copyright infringement. Users cannot apply
103. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
104. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)
(explaining that "anyone... who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the copyright

with respect to such use").
105. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
106. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (deciding whether

parody is a fair use).
107. Id.

108. Id. at 586.
109. Id.

110. Id. at 590.
111. Id.
112. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
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fair use principles until after their content is removed and the copyright
holder alleges infringement. 13 This concept was illustrated in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 114 At trial, the owners of the copyright to Roy
Orbinson's song, "Oh, Pretty Woman," alleged that the rap music group 2
Live Crew, and its record label, infringed the copyright when 2 Live Crew
released its own rendition similarly titled, "Pretty Woman."'" 15 The main
issue before the Supreme Court was whether 2 Live Crew's song could be
construed as fair use within the meaning of the Act.1 16 Both parties
acknowledged that, absent a finding of fair use through parody, 2 Live
Crew's song was an infringement. 117 After considering the four fair use
factors, the Court found that 2 Live Crew had a valid fair use defense
because the use of Orbinson's song was parody."1 8
This case can be compared to those involving UGC and the DMCA.
It is important to note that in Acuff-Rose, the members of 2 Live Crew
could not have asserted fair use prior to releasing their song.11 9 2 Live
Crew could only raise the fair use defense after they were sued. Thus, prior
to releasing the album, 2 Live Crew and its record label sought permission
from Acuff-Rose to use Orbison's song.1 20 2 Live Crew's manager sent the
lyrics and a recording of the song to Acuff-Rose and offered to
appropriately credit the authors of the original song in addition to paying a
royalty fee.121 However, Acuff-Rose denied the request.1 22 Regardless, 2
Live Crew released the album containing the parody, giving credit 12to3
Orbison and Acuff-Rose as the original authors of "Oh, Pretty Woman."'
124
The album sold nearly 250,000 copies before Acuff-Rose filed suit.
In a typical case of UGC and copyright infringement, it would be
unrealistic and inefficient for a home video creator to seek the permission
of a record company for use of background music. UGC creators will
likely not have the resources to petition a record company for permission.

113. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (explaining that courts must look at the four-factor
test after infringement to see if the fair use defense applies).
114. Id. at 569.
115. Id. at 572-73.
116. Id. at 571-72.
117. Id. at 574.
118. Id. at 594.
119. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (explaining that courts will only undergo the four factor
analysis to apply fair use after copyright infringement is alleged).
120. Id. at 572-73.
121. Id. at 572.
122. Id. at 572-73.
123. Id. at 573.
124. Id.
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Likewise, copyright holders would be inundated with requests seeking
permission to use their content. Because the fair use doctrine operates
solely as a defense, it does not offer blanket permission to all those who
meet its four criteria. Therefore, if copyright holders decide to aggressively
pursue infringement cases, the fair use doctrine alone does not protect UGC
creators against both the risk of costly litigation and the removal of their
work.
D. The Relationship Between Consumers and Copyright Holders
Congress created the DMCA to compel websites and Internet service
providers (ISPs) to assist in the battle against online piracy by granting
them a safe harbor from copyright infringement liability. 125 Websites and
ISPs were given a powerful tool to fight copyright infringement while the
rights of copyright holders remain protected. But what about consumers?
Consumers, especially those who upload UGC, are a large, but seemingly
forgotten, demographic whose rights are not well-represented under the
DMCA. Admittedly, the misrepresentation clause of the DMCA does
provide some recourse for consumers who are the subject of wrongful
126 However, consumers may only act after their content
takedown notices.
127
is taken down.
The relationship between consumers and copyright holders can best
be explained by dividing consumers into three categories.12 8 Identifying
the types of consumers and their respective interests "may introduce a new
dimension to standard copyright analysis, which often favors copyright
owners, by incorporating a legitimate interest.., to balance the scope of
rights shaped by the ... DMCA regime."' 2 9 Understanding the different
types of interactions between consumers and copyright holders will help
create a copyright framework that promotes creativity and opportunities for
UGC.
Traditional views of copyright law deal with the first two types of
consumers: the "consumer-shopper" and the "consumer-author."' 130 The
consumer-shopper is one who purchases products based on the price and

125. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004).
126. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006).
127. Id.
128. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1119, 1138 (2007) (separating consumers into three categories and proposing that new
"consumer-participants" be given rights).
129. Id. at 1122.
130. Id.
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the utility of the product.' 3' These types of consumers are passive and
generally do not factor in to copyright law because they usually do not help
promote the policy of copyright law. 13 2 The only way consumer-shoppers
can help further the goals of copyright law is to create the market
for
33
information and, thus, encourage others to produce original content.'
Consumer-authors create new content by building upon pre-existing
works. 134 They help further copyright's policy goals of promoting
creativity and productivity, and are an important consideration in any
discussion of copyright law. 135 "Creation is presumed to be incrementalnew works are built upon previous works-and the rights of current authors
are balanced against those of subsequent authors.' 36 Consumer-authors
change, or even improve, pre-existing works and promote creativity by
adding something unique to the original work. 137 This type of consumer is
entitled to protection from copyright laws because they are able to show
that their use of the original
material is productive and adds something new
38
benefit.
for everyone's
The third type of consumer is one who makes use of copyrighted
works for self-consumption or for their own personal benefit.' 39 These
"consumer-participants" include users who upload UGC onto the Internet
and who risk being accused of copyright violations because of their
actions.14° A commentator has stated that "[fjrom this perspective, both
authors and consumers of information actively participate in advancing the
ultimate goal of copyright law, which is promoting progress.'' Copyright
law encourages people to participate in the creative process rather than
simply encouraging the creation of content. 42 The creation process
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1138.
133. See id. ("To the extent that consumers are present under a traditional copyright
framework, they are treated as purchasers of copies who, by paying for access to copyrighted
materials, provide just compensation and secure incentives to authors so that authors will invest
in further creation.").
134. Elkin-Koren, supra not 128, at 1138.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1139.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1139-41.
140. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 128, at 1141. Because users take part in the creative
process, UGC should fall into this category.
141. Id. at 1139-40 (elaborating further that progress is served "by providing authors with
sufficient incentives to invest in producing new works" and allowing "the public [to] gain access
to these works and be able to extract their value").
142. Id. at 1140.
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43
involves pre-existing content and the input of human capital.
"Consumption, in this sense, cultivates ... further creation: it educates; it
stimulates our minds; it expands our understanding of the world around us;
it provides inspiration., 144 Furthermore, recognizing the benefits of
consumption-as-participation is important to ensure that creativity can
emerge at all levels. 145 An analysis of copyright law shows that it can
incorporate the interests and rights of consumer-participants.1 46 The rights
of copyright holders, who often spend large amounts of money lobbying
for laws that many consumers are unaware of, 147 should be balanced with
those of consumers. One way to find that balance is to incorporate the fair
use doctrine into provisions of the DMCA.

1II.

THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO USER GENERATED CONTENT

A. The CurrentSubjective Good Faith Analysis in the DigitalMillennium
CopyrightAct
In Lenz v. UniversalMusic Corp., the plaintiff contended that her use
148
of the Prince song should be exempt from copyright infringement.
Lenz's argument was that fair use authorized the use of the copyrighted
material.' 49 She further argued that copyright holders cannot make a good
faith infringement claim, as required by the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA), "without considering all authorized uses of the material,
including fair use.' ', 50 Lenz asserted that copyright holders should make a
fact-specific determination before issuing takedown notices.1 51 On the
other hand, Universal argued that it should not even have to evaluate fair
use before issuing a takedown notice because it would "lose the ability to
respond rapidly to potential infringements." 152 Universal also claimed that
"fair use is merely an excused infringement of' a53copyright rather than a use
authorizedby the copyright owner or by law."'

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. at 1140-41.
Id. at 1152.
Elkin-Koren, supra note 128, at 1122.
Id. at 1154.
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
Id. at 1154.
Id.
Id. at 1154-55.
Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1154.

178

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 29:163

Lenz has not been decided, 54 but if the court finds for Lenz, copyright
holders will have to make a fair use analysis for every takedown notice sent
out. 155 Otherwise, copyright holders will risk liability for misrepresentation
of their claims. 56 It is difficult for a user to sue a record company alleging
it knowingly misrepresented a copyright infringement claim by using the
same criteria employed in Diebold.157 However, the mere threat of
litigation may deter record companies from overzealously asserting
copyright infringement and require them to consider whether each
individual case is reasonable. On the other hand, if the court rules that fair
use is never self-evident and that the copyright holder only has to use a
subjective good faith analysis, then consumers such as Lenz are back to
square one-at risk of unreasonable takedown notices at the hands of
copyright holders.
A federal district court in Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of
America Inc. ,'58 was the first to interpret the meaning of "good faith belief'
within the context of the DMCA. 159 In Rossi, the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) issued takedown notices for Rossi's
website, internetmovies.com, based on the belief that it provided
downloads of movies to members.' 60 In fact, although the website
advertised "Full Length Downloadable
Movies" and "NOW
DOWNLOADABLE," no movies were available for download.' 6' Instead,
Rossi described his website as an online directory of websites containing
information about movies for paid members.' 62 The MPAA filed a
takedown notice under the DMCA after one of its members found the
website. 63 Rossi was notified that his page would be taken down, but he
was able to find another server to host it prior to commencing his lawsuit
against the MPAA.' 64 Rossi's main argument was that the MPAA did not
have enough information to form a "good faith belief' that he had infringed

154. Universal's motion to dismiss the case was denied on August 20, 2008. Lenz, 572 F.
Supp. 2dat 1151.
155. Id. at 1154.
156. Id. at 1154-55.
157. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004);
see discussion supra Part II.B.
158. Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of America Inc., 391 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).
159. Id. at 1004.
160. Id. at 1001-02.
161. Id. at 1002-03.
162. Id. at 1002.
163. Id.
164. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1002.
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the MPAA's copyright, as required by the DMCA. 65 Furthermore, Rossi
contended that a copyright holder must conduct a reasonable investigation
into the allegedly infringing activity to have a good faith belief of a
copyright violation. 166 Rossi argued that if the MPAA had conducted such
an investigation of his website, it would have concluded that his website
was not a source for downloading movies and therefore was not in
violation of any copyrights. 167 Essentially, Rossi argued for an objective
standard of review for measuring the reasonableness of the MPAA's
takedown notice.168 The MPAA, on the other hand, argued that "the good
could have
faith belief requirement is subjective" and noted that Congress
169
standard.
objective
specific
a
impose
expressly
not
but did
In its discussion, the court first noted the legislative intent of the
DMCA to "balance the need for rapid response to potential infringement
with the end-users [sic] legitimate interests in not having material removed
without recourse" 170 by "preserv[ing] strong incentives for service
providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with
copyright infringements.1 71 The court pointed to prior decisions where
"good faith" in other federal statutes was traditionally interpreted as a
subjective standard, distinct from an objective standard. 72 The court
explained that Congress understood this distinction and "could have easily
incorporated an objective standard of reasonableness" when it enacted the
DMCA. 173 However, since Congress did not do so, the court inferred
Congress's intent to use the subjective standard traditionally associated
with a good faith requirement.174
The court buttressed its conclusion by focusing on the particular
structure of the statute.175 The court pointed to Congress's inclusion of a
cause of action for improper infringement notifications where a copyright
holder is liable only after a demonstration of some actual knowledge of
misrepresentation.176 According to the court, this statutory structure
imposes liability upon copyright holders only for knowing
165. Id. at 1003.
166. Id.
167. Id.

168. Id. at 1004.
169. Id.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1003 (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 21 (1998)).
Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49 (1998)).
Id. at 1004.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Rossi, 391 F.3d atiO04-05.
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misrepresentations. 177 Therefore, "[m]easuring compliance with a lesser
'objective reasonableness' standard would be inconsistent with the
Congress's apparent intent that the statute protect potential
violators from
178
subjectively improper actions by copyright owners."
The court used the statutory structure of the DMCA, along with case
law, to support its conclusion that the DMCA required only a subjective
good faith belief. 179 The court examined the information on Rossi's
website and concluded that the representations on the website led the
MPAA to presume in good faith that there were movies available for
download80 and, therefore, had a valid reason to issue the takedown
notices.'
B. Is a Subjective Good Faith StandardPreferable?
It is easy to see how the copyright holders in Lenz and Rossi were led
to believe that their copyrights were being infringed. For example, in Lenz,
the title of the video was nearly identical to that of the Prince song.1 8 1 In
Rossi, the website's advertisements were sufficient to fool visitors into
1 82
thinking that there actually were movies available for download.
However, large media conglomerates-common copyright holders-have
extensive resources at hand that should permit at least a cursory
investigation into potential infringement of their copyrights.
If, for example, Universal Music Corp. (Universal) was compelled to
use an objective good faith standard, it would probably realize that a short
video clip of a toddler dancing to the faint background music of a Universal
artist is insufficient for a finding of copyright infringement. In September
2007, Prince publicly spoke out about his efforts to "reclaim his art on the
Internet," and threatened to sue for infringement. 83 Lenz asserted that
Universal sent the takedown notice to appease Prince and did not possess
any good faith belief that there was copyright infringement.1 84 If required
to use a list of objective criteria in assessing the video, it is unlikely that the
177. Id. at 1005.
178. Id. (emphasis in original).

179. Id. at 1004.
180. Id. at 1005.
181. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Lenz's
video was titled "Let's Go Crazy #1" while Prince's song was called "Let's Go Crazy." Id. at
1152.
182. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005. Rossi acknowledged that his own customers often believed
that actual movie downloads were available. Id.
183. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.
184. Id.
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reviewer, acting on behalf of Universal, would have sought a takedown
notice.
Likewise, if the MPAA in Rossi was compelled to use an objective
good faith standard, it would probably find insufficient evidence of
copyright infringement. The court in Rossi noted that many anti-piracy
departments use software to roam the Internet to detect potentially
infringing material. 185 The MPAA acknowledged that it uses this type of
software in conjunction with a few employees who actually review the redflagged sites, and that it is the employees who ultimately decide whether a
website contains infringing material. 186 All an MPAA employee had to do
was attempt to download a movie and, being unable to do so, conclude that
there was no copyright violation.
A subjective good faith standard makes it easier for media
conglomerates, such as Universal, to issue takedown notices without
pausing to consider the content and context of the user generated content
(UGC). But why do copyright holders file seemingly unreasonable suits
claiming infringement? One reason could be that after being exposed to
piracy in the digital age for so long, copyright
holders have an "itchy
7
rights.1
their
asserting
when
finger"
trigger
When protecting a right essential to one's livelihood, one may lose
sight of the bigger picture. In Lenz, the bigger picture included the
negative press generated by such actions against a working mother--one
commentator called Universal's actions "the latest, and most extreme,
example of content producers attempting to prevent any use of copyright
material without their permission."' 188 This negative publicity often leads to
an increased "backlash" among users and advocacy groups who argue that
copyright holders wrongfully and illegally send takedown notices. 89 Use
of the current mode of subjective analysis may expose both parties to
expensive litigation by giving rise to multiple simultaneous lawsuits by
consumers, such as Lenz, against a large copyright holder, such as
Universal.

185. Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005 n.7.
186. Id.
187. See Craig W. Walker, Note, Application of the DMCA Safe HarborProvisions to
Search Engines, 9 VA. L.J. & TECH. 1, 3 (2004) (acknowledging "the increase in copyright
infringement that has accompanied the proliferation of the Internet").
188. Mark Huffman, Universal Sues Over Background Music In Toddler Video,
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM,

July 26, 2007,

http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/07/crazy.html (emphasis added).
189. See Catherine Rampell, Standing Up To Takedown Notices, WASH. POST, Oct. 19,
2007, at D2 (reporting that challenges to copyright claims appears to be increasing).
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C. CopyrightHolders Should Employ an Objective Good Faith Standard
An objective good faith standard would compliment the fair use
doctrine already established in common law and codified in the Copyright
Act. 190 When a copyright holder alleges an infringement, courts have
applied the fair use doctrine as a guideline to decide what kinds of uses to
permit.1 91 Likewise, the DMCA can incorporate a similar analysis and
require those alleging infringement to establish sufficient ground for filing
a takedown notice based on the facts of the individual case. Such a
framework would curb the number of frivolous takedown notices and
protect of UGC creators.
D. A Recommendationfor an Objective Good Faith Standard
An objective good faith standard based on the fair use doctrine need
not be complicated. The following three-prong test would sufficiently
separate fair use of copyrighted works from obvious and egregious
copyright violations:
(1) Does the user profit from the uploaded content?
(2) Does the user's content hurt or devalue, or threaten to hurt or
devalue, the copyrighted work?
(3) Does the user broadcast substantially all of the copyrighted
work without attempting to add content or express creativity?
This framework, if incorporated into the DMCA, could balance the rights
of UGC creators with those of media companies seeking to protect their
copyrights.
If the answers to all three of the above questions are "no," then the
DMCA should prohibit the copyright holder from sending a takedown
notice. This framework will promote equity between copyright holders and
those consumer-participants who wish to use such works for noncommercial, creative purposes.
1. Does the User Profit From the Uploaded Content?
The first question, whether a user is gaining financially from the
UGC, is stricter than the fair use allowed under the Copyright Act' 92 since

190. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976).
191. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433
(1984) (holding an "individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use').
192. See, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) (holding that the
commercial nature of the work is only one factor in the enquiry).
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fair use is a defense even if the copyright infringer makes money from the
work.1 93 This part of the analysis focuses on the user and asks whether the
user has benefitted at the expense of others. It also indirectly asks whether
a user can realistically make a living from the UGC in question, thereby
becoming a professional media creator. Not protecting the right to make a
profit from UGC falls within the spirit of that type of media-media
created by amateurs for home and personal use. This analysis also protects
the amateur nature of UGC since the user is not making a profit from the
use of another's copyrighted work.
Admittedly, this question does not address the fact that content
hosting sites gain the most under this type of fair use analysis. For
194
example, YouTube gains revenue from advertisements shown on its site.
The more visitors that view YouTube's site, the more it can charge its
advertisers. 95 Therefore, it benefits YouTube to have less-restrictive
copyright laws for UGC because it can attract more users and viewers to its
site, regardless of whether the UGC creator gained financially from the use
of copyrighted work.
Another scenario that further complicates the situation above is that
YouTube now offers revenue sharing for qualified "independent video
creators and media companies who are looking for online distribution and
who meet our qualifications."' 96 In a revenue-sharing program, the hosting
website shares a portion of the proceeds generated from the views of the
uploaded video with the video's creator. 197 The website acts as a
distribution platform for UGC. The YouTube Partner Program requires
that all videos contain original content and that all creators own the
copyrights for "all audio and video content."' 98
This originality
requirement negates the need for fair use policy since there is no use of
another's copyrighted work. Presumably, YouTube screens each applicant
of the Partner Program and checks all uploaded content for originality. 199
193. See id. at 594 (holding that 2 Live Crew's commercial release of parody song is

acceptable fair use).
194. Brian Stelter, Those YouTube Videos Are Pullingin Serious Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2008, at A26.
195. See id. (discussing the relationship between traffic and revenue).
196. YouTube, The YouTube Partner Program: Cash in on Your Creativity,
http://www.youtube.com/partners (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) [hereinafter YouTube Partner
Program].
197. Brian Stelter, Those Funny YouTube Videos Are Pullingin Serious Money, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at Al.
198. See YouTube Partner Program, supra note 196.
199. The author attempted to sign up for the Partner Program and received the following
error message: "Based on an automated review of your account it is unlikely that you will qualify
for the YouTube Partner Program. Applications are reviewed for a variety of criteria, including
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However, the possibility still exists that other UGC-hosting websites will
offer similar revenue sharing programs, without a stringent originality
requirement.
2. Does the User's Content Hurt or Devalue, or Threaten to Hurt or
Devalue, the Copyrighted Work?
The second question, whether the UGC hurts or devalues the
copyrighted work, shifts the focus from the uploader of UGC to the
copyright holder. This part of the analysis protects the right of copyright
holders to exclusively profit from their works. It would be unfair for UGC
to devalue the original copyrighted work. Again, this question attempts to
balance the rights of UGC creators with those of copyright holders: not
only should the UGC creator not gain financially from their creation, the
copyright holder's stake must not be negatively impacted. Unauthorized
uses of copyrighted works devalue or harm the creator when UGC takes
away from the sales of the original. For example, if Lenz's YouTube video
containing Prince's music actually posed a threat to the sale of Prince's
music, then Universal could satisfy this criterion.200 However, under this
framework, it is unlikely that Universal could show that a short home video
would hurt sales.
Another hypothetical is to take the 2 Live Crew parody of "Oh, Pretty
Woman" and change the facts of the case to fit today's world. 0° Suppose 2
Live Crew was an amateur band and uploaded the song onto its blog for its
friends and family to listen to free of charge. Nevertheless, the holder of
the copyright in the original song may have an objective belief that the
parody is not a fair use. To establish such a belief, the copyright holder
must show how the parody threatens to hurt sales of the original hit song. 2
In this hypothetical, the amateur band and its free access to its paradoy of
the copyrighted song is unlikely to hurt the sales of the original song. On
the other hand, under the original facts of Acuff-Rose Music,z° 3 the record
company would have a good chance of showing that 2 Live Crew, a
professional band making a profit from its parody, is hurting sales of the
original song.
There are at least two ways that Acuff-Rose could show that the

but not limited to the size of your audience, country of residence, quality of content, and
consistency with our Community Guidelines and Terms of Use."
200. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
201. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994).
202. Id.
203. Id.
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parody is hurting or devaluing the original. First, it could conduct surveys
showing that respondents believed 2 Live Crew's song was an original
composition and they did not know Roy Orbison's song existed. Such a
showing would demonstrate harm to the copyrighted work because the
public is misled as to the origin of the song. Simply put, the listener does
not place credit where it is due because of the parody. Second, Acuff-Rose
could show that radio play of the original song has declined since the
release of the parody, thus hurting its revenue.
One problem with this second prong is that it places the copyright
holder at risk of losing money before it can show that UGC is hurting its
copyrighted work. To answer the second question in the affirmative, the
copyright holder will likely wait weeks to gather the results of the market
research. By then, it is likely that the copyright holder will lose revenue.
However, these uses of copyrighted works in UGC are unlikely to
substantially affect large media companies and may in fact indirectly
benefit them.20 4 Society should place the cost associated with protecting
the fair use of copyrighted works on those who are most capable of bearing
the burden. A media company which takes a small loss from lack of radio
play can more easily absorb the costs than a private individual like Lenz,
who would have to spend considerable amounts of time and money to
procure legal counsel to fight copyright infringement allegations. Thus, it
is equitable to require the copyright holder to be sure of the devaluation of
its copyrighted work before bringing suit, even where it involves absorbing
an initial loss in revenue. This ensures there is no arbitrary takedown of
UGC.
3. Does the User Broadcast Substantially All of the Copyrighted Work
Without Attempting to Add Content or to Express Creativity?
Finally, the third question asks if the user broadcasted substantially all
of the copyrighted work without any attempt to add content or creative
expression. This question shifts the focus away from the user and
copyright holder to the furtherance of public policy goals. Part of the
legislative intent of the DMCA was to "ensure[] that the efficiency of the
Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of
204. See, e.g., Amy R. Mellow, Note,... And the Ruling on the FieldIs Fair: A FairUse
Analysis of Uploading NFL Videos onto YouTube and Why the NFL Should License Its Material
to the Website, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 173, 192 (2007) (explaining that short video clips of
NFL games on YouTube do not affect the marketability of live broadcasts); Michael Driscoll,
Comment, Will YouTube Sail into the DMCA 's Safe Harboror Sinkfor Internet Piracy?, 6 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 550, 564-66 (2007) (explaining the marketing benefits of
unauthorized YouTube video clips for network giants NBC and CBS).
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services on the Internet will expand" without compromising "the movies,
music, software, and literary works that are the fruit of American creative
genius. ' ' 20 5 Requiring creators of UGC to add content or creative
expression ensures that the use of the copyrighted work, even if somewhat
detrimental to the copyright holder's interests, promotes important social
goals. Objective criteria applied to the fair use policy will allow freedom
of expression and help foster creativity. Society is better off when
individuals are free to discover new methods of creating videos or blogs
without the fear of copyright infringement stifling their creativity.
Lenz's video of her toddler dancing is an example of adding new
content to a copyrighted work.2 °6 In fact, since the focus of the video is her
child,20 7 it is probably better to characterize her video as adding
copyrighted work.to original content. Indeed, it is already clear that Lenz
is not making a profit from her video because the video is not sold, and she
is not receiving a share of the advertisement revenue from YouTube. 20 8 It
is also unlikely that her video has hurt the artistic reputation of Prince or
has decreased his record sales. 20 9 Lenz did what millions of people around
the world do every day-she shot videotape footage of her child to
But, instead of keeping the footage on her
preserve memories. 2 1
videotape, Lenz utilized today's technology to share her video with friends
and family. 2 11 Lenz used the tools and resources available to her to foster
her imagination and share her creativity. 21 2 Lenz did not set out to use the
Prince song in her video-the use of the song was incidental because her
child happened to be dancing to that particular song. 21 3 The focus, or
original content, of the video is the toddler dancing.21 4 The background, or
copyrighted work, is the Prince song.21 5 In essence, Lenz did not purposely
set out to create new content; she simply captured a spontaneous moment
that happened to contain a copyrighted work.
An example of UGC failing the third prong of this framework is
205. S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
206. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
207. Rampell, supra note 189 at Dl.
208. Jonathan Bailey, Copyright Cases to Watch: Lenz v.Universal, THE BLOG HERALD,
Oct. 8, 2007, http://www.blogherald.com/2007/10/08/copyright-cases-to-watch-lenz-v-universaU.
209. Lawrence Lessig, DigitalEconomy Remixes Outmoded Copyright Notions, WINNIPEG
FREE PRESS, Jan. 11, 2009, at DO.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2datl 152.
Lessig, supra note 209, at DO.
Id.
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.
Rampell, supra note 189, at D 1.
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.
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copyrighted content uploaded onto websites simply for the sake of
distribution. There are many examples of entire copyrighted music videos
that are uploaded onto websites. 2 16 These music videos are usually
recorded from television and then broadcast over the Internet to a wider
audience. z 7 This "copy and paste" activity, without more, does not
promote the societal goals mentioned above.
There was no use of
creativity and the unauthorized presence of the video on the Internet does
nothing to inspire other viewers to use their own imagination.
Another prevalent example of UGC that will not pass muster with the
third prong is copyrighted songs uploaded onto YouTube with no
accompanying video content.218 In these instances, the viewer watches a
black screen, which sometimes displays the song title and lyrics as the
music plays. 21 9 Here, the song is uploaded almost in its entirety for the
sake of sharing music. There is no added content to the song and no video
images that accompany the music to show the uploader used creativity and
inventiveness. 220 This does not promote society's goals of enhancing the
Internet or nurturing imagination because it fails to inspire and lacks
creative development.
In conclusion, if the answers to the objective three-pronged
framework are all in the negative, then the DMCA should prohibit the
copyright holder from sending a takedown notice. This suggested way
promotes an equitable balance between the rights of copyright holders and
those of consumer-participants.
IV.

ANOTHER VIEW OF USER GENERATED CONTENT AND COPYRIGHT

LAW

In late 2007, several leading Internet and media companies adopted a
set of guidelines that would govern user generated content (UGC), known
as the Principles for User Generated Content Services (Principles).2 2'
216. Eugene C. Kim, Note, YouTube: Testing the Safe Harborsof Digital Copyright Law,
17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 139, 141 (2007).
217. See Sebastian Borza, Music Videos and Copyright, Information Technology and the
Law, Apr. 6, 2005, http://courseblog.cs.princeton.edu/spring05/cos491/?p=276 ("In general,
people can copy music videos to a digital recorder like the TiVO relatively easily, as with any
other TV show. From here, the videos are then 'ripped' to the user's computer.., and then
passed throughout the internet via BitTorrent, mIRC, webpages, and other p2p programs.").
218. See, e.g., YouTube, The Scientist-Coldplay with lyrics,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-7Z2wTU8PONg (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). A quick search
of any popular song on YouTube will show the prevalence of music without video.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Principles for User Generated Content Services, http://www.ugcprinciples.com (last
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These companies include CBS, Disney, Fox Entertainment, Microsoft,
MySpace, NBC-Universal, Sony, and Viacom.222 However, some notable
industry giants did not sign on: Google, including its subsidiary YouTube,
and Facebook.223 The enacted Principles act as a compromise in which
copyright holders will not sue content providers so long as the latter makes
a concerted effort to block infringing materials. 224 The Principle's four
main objectives are: "(1) the elimination of infringing content on UGC
Services, (2) the encouragement of uploads of wholly original and
authorized user-generated audio and video content, (3) the accommodation
services, and (4) the protection
of fair use of copyrighted content on UGC
' 225
"
privacy.
user
of
interests
legitimate
of
The Principles are not legally binding. They are simply an agreement
between industry powerhouses to work together and self-regulate before
taking the costly route of litigation.2 26 Indeed, supporters note that the
Principles are "not intended to be and should not be construed as a
concession or waiver with respect to any legal or policy position or as
creating any legally binding rights or obligations. 2 2 7 The most notable
feature of the Principles is that they require content providers to install
filtering software that patrols for infringing content.228 Supporters of the
Principles believe that filtering software can effectively and efficiently
identify infringing content by comparing the content to "Reference
Material" provided by copyright owners. 229 The Reference Material
includes "(1) the reference data for content required to establish a match
with user-uploaded content, (2) instructions regarding how matches should
be treated, and (3) representations made in good faith that [the copyright
holder] possesses the appropriate rights regarding the content. ' '230 Google,
YouTube, and Facebook-leaders in search technology, video sharing, and
social networking, respectively-did not agree to the Principles 231 likely
visited Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter Principles].
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id. (explaining that "[i]f a UGC Service adheres to all of these Principles in good
faith, the Copyright Owner should not assert a claim of copyright infringement against such UGC
Service with respect to infringing user-uploaded content that might remain on the UGC Service
despite such adherence to these Principles").
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Principles, supra note 221.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Sherwin Siy, Unprincipled "Principles"for User GeneratedContent, PUBLIC
KNOWLEDGE, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1230 (explaining that
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due to the risk of alienating their customer bases if they used intrusive
filtering technologies.
The Principles also note, "When sending notices and making claims
of infringement, Copyright Owners should accommodate fair use. '232
However, the Principles do not state how fair use should be evaluated.233
There is no mention of whether copyright owners should evaluate fair use
based on a subjective or objective reasonableness standard.23 4 Thus, the
Principles fail to address the dispute regarding what standard is more
equitable in balancing the rights of copyright holders and consumerparticipants.
Finally, the most glaring flaw of the Principles is that they fail to
include any consumer advocacy groups.23 5 The agreement is a compromise
between two competing giants-the "copyright owner" and the "UGC
Service. 2 36 However, perhaps the most important voice, that of the
consumer, is not represented at all. The Principles help foster a better
understanding between copyright holders and UGC services, but they do
not take into account the concerns of UGC creators.2 37 Ordinary users who
create UGC still have no recourse if their content is wrongfully and
unfairly taken down.
V.

CONCLUSION

When the House of Representatives (House) passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), the House noted, "The principle of
fair use involves a balancing process, whereby the exclusive interests of
copyright owners are balanced against the competing needs of users of
information. '238 The House also recognized that fair use is "critical to
advancing the personal interests of consumers" and "critical to promoting a
Google/YouTube, Facebook, and Yahoo are all absent from the Principles probably because they
did not want others regulating their business or enforced deadlines).
232. Principles, supra note 221.
233. See id. (explaining that copyright owners and UGC services should cooperate in
accommodating fair use before infringement occurs, but never explaining what constitutes fair
use or the standard to be applied).
234. See id. (arguing that in order for both copyright owners and UGC services to comply
with the Principles, a standard for fair use must be set).
235. See id. (explaining that the Principles only encompass the interests of the UGC
operators and not the consumer-participants who post the UGC).
236. Id.
237. Siy, supra note 231 (arguing that the Principles do not take into account the interests of
the consumer-participants who create the UGC).
238. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998) (noting that "[t]his balance is deeply
embedded in the long history of copyright law").
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robust electronic marketplace., 239 Despite the culture of fair use embedded
in copyright law, the DMCA still appears to favor copyright holders
because a mere subjective good faith belief of copyright violation is
sufficient to warrant a takedown notice.240 This leaves the contentgenerating user with a choice: live with the takedown or spend legal fees to
fight media giants.
The proposal of an objective standard requires the copyright holder to
ask and answer three questions in good faith before the copyright holder
decides to send a takedown notice. 24' This proposal invokes the spirit of
the fair use doctrine and is an equitable balance between competing
interests. The House committee even recognized the need for an equitable
balance when drafting the DMCA because many of the expressed private
and public interests predicted that the new law would "undermine
Congress' long-standing commitment to the concept of fair use. 242 The
House report on the DMCA included an excerpt of a letter sent to the
committee by the Consumers' Union, an independent consumer advocacy
group:
"These newly-created rights will dramatically diminish public
access to information, reducing the ability of researchers,
authors, critics, scholars, teachers, students, and consumers to
find, to quote for publication and otherwise make fair use of
them. It would be ironic if the great popularization of access to
information, which is the promise of the electronic age, will be
short-changed by legislation that purports to promote this
promise, but in reality puts a monopoly stranglehold on
information. 2 43
The Consumers' Union wrote the letter in 1998. User generated content
(UGC) has been around in one form or another since the early years of the
Internet. However, UGC did not become a dominant form of global media
affecting how audiences are reached until the last five years, with the
widespread availability of high-speed Internet access and search
technology. 244 Still, these decade-old concerns regarding traditional forms
of media can be applied to UGC. Congress can reconsider the DMCA in
light of new technological developments, such as UGC, or the courts,
239. Id. at 26.
240. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (explaining that the allegation must merely be made in
writing and under good faith for a takedown notice to be issued).
241. See discussion supra Part III.D.
242. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26 (1998).
243. Id.
244. See LAB I, supra note 1.
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beginning with Lenz v. Universal, can interpret the DMCA to require an
objective good faith standard before a takedown notice is sent.245 After all,
Congress "fully respects and extends into the digital environment the
bedrock principle of 'balance' in American intellectual property law for the
benefit of both copyright owners and users.''246 Thus, an objectively
reasonable standard in determining fair use would restore the balance
between copyright holders and users. This balance benefits all if it can
effectively reduce litigation and improve the relationship between UGC
creators and copyright holders. The three-part framework in analyzing
objective good faith seeks to find this balance by using fact-specific
questions that can be answered objectively. Therefore, the amateur nature
of UGC and the right of copyright holders to exclusively profit from their
work would be protected, while still promoting the important societal goal
of inspiring creativity.
Ian Chuang*
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